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Abstract. A new distinguishing property against block ciphers, called
the division property, was introduced by Todo at Eurocrypt 2015. Our
work gives a new approach to it by the introduction of the notion of parity
sets. First of all, this new notion permits us to formulate and character-
ize in a simple way the division property of any order. At a second step,
we are interested in the way of building distinguishers on a block cipher
by considering some further properties of parity sets, generalising the
division property. We detail in particular this approach for substitution-
permutation networks. To illustrate our method, we provide low-data dis-
tinguishers against reduced-round Present. These distinguishers reach
a much higher number of rounds than generic distinguishers based on
the division property and demonstrate, amongst others, how the distin-
guishers can be improved when the properties of the linear and the Sbox
layer are taken into account. At last, this work provides an analysis of
the resistance of Sboxes against this type of attacks, demonstrates links
with the algebraic normal form of an Sbox as well as its inverse Sbox
and exhibit design criteria for Sboxes to resist such attacks.
Keywords: division property, integral attacks, Sboxes, Present.
1 Introduction
A new distinguishing property against block ciphers, called the division property,
was recently introduced by Todo [25]. This property, that can be seen as a gen-
eralization of integral [16, 9] and higher-order differential [17, 15] distinguishers,
was used to present new generic distinguishers against both the SPN and the
Feistel constructions. Later, this attack was used by the same author to present
the first cryptanalysis of the full block cipher Misty [24].
If u = (u1, . . . , un) is a vector of F
n
2 , we denote by x
u the coordinate product
x = (x1, . . . , xn) 7→
∏n
i=1 x
ui
i . The division property, as introduced by Todo [25],
is interested in the sum of this quantity taken over all vectors of X. More
precisely, we say that a set X ⊆ Fn2 has the division property Dnk , for some
1 ≤ k ≤ n, if the sum over all vectors x in X of the product xu equals 0, for all
vectors u that have a Hamming weight strictly less than k, i.e.⊕
x∈X
xu = 0 for all u ∈ Fn2 such that wt(u) < k.
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The division property then generalizes integral attacks in the sense that Dn2
means that the set X is balanced, while Dnn means that it is saturated. But the
novelty is that it introduces intermediate properties, Dnk for 3 ≤ k ≤ n−1, which
do not appear in classical integral attacks. Even if these intermediate properties
do not have a simple interpretation like Dn2 and Dnn, they allow to easily propa-
gate the property through the successive rounds of a cipher by capturing some
information resulting from the algebraic degree of the round function. In a nut-
shell, the distinguishers described by Todo in [25, 24] are classical higher-order
differential distinguishers, but they are exhibited by exploiting the classical prop-
erties used in integral attacks together with some algebraic properties related to
the degree of several iterations of a nonlinear function like in [8, 6].
Our contribution. This work aims at providing new insights into the division
property, presenting a new approach to it. This new approach enables us to
provide a simpler formulation and interpretation of the division property of any
order. It also improves the strength of the distinguishers that exploit this type
of properties. For this, we introduce a new notion, that we call the parity set.
The parity set of a set X ⊆ Fn2 is nothing more than the set of all exponents
u ∈ Fn2 such that
⊕
x∈X x
u = 1. The main advantage of this new notion is
that it completely characterises a set X in the sense that there is a one-to-one
correspondence between sets and their parity sets. It also provides a very simple
formulation of the division property. In particular, we show that the division
property of any order can be expressed in an elegant way by using the theory
of Reed-Muller codes. One of the first questions we investigate in this work is
what does it mean for a set X to have the division property Dnk for some special
values of k. As previously explained, this question was treated for k ∈ {1, 2, n}
in previous works [25, 22, 14]. However, our approach, and especially the link
with the Reed-Muller codes, permits us to recover in a much simpler way these
previous results and to characterize the property for some other values of k.
We investigate next the question of how to build distinguishers for keyed
permutations by means of parity sets. For this, we start by analyzing the dis-
tinguishers built by Todo in [25] and formulate them in terms of parity sets.
These distinguishers were of a generic nature as they only exploited the clas-
sical integral properties and the propagation of the algebraic degree through
the successive non-linear layers. It is thus natural to believe that these distin-
guishers can be improved if additional information besides the degree is taken
into account, in the same spirit as in cube distinguishers [12, 1]. We investigate
this issue here and provide a way to exploit these more precise properties. We
then further show how to find distinguishers on iterated block ciphers, especially
on substitution-permutation networks, by propagating some information on the
parity set of the output set through the successive rounds of the cipher. For this,
we provide a detailed analysis of the evolution of the parity set through the basic
operations of the round function of an SPN cipher.
We illustrate the above technique by constructing low-data distinguishers on
the Present block cipher. With this example we aim at particularly showing
how the generic distinguishers can be improved when the properties of the linear
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and the Sbox layer are taken into account. We manage to provide a distinguisher
on 6 rounds of Present with data complexity 212, while the generic distinguisher
from [25], reaches only 3 rounds for the same quantity of data. Finally, we analyze
the resistance of Sboxes against this type of attack, show a link with the algebraic
normal forms of the Sbox and of its inverse, and we give a criterion that an Sbox
must satisfy in order to resist this kind of attacks.
Organization of the paper. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
introduces the notion of the parity set of a set and shows how it is related to
Reed-Muller codes. Section 3 presents the link between this new notion and the
division property, and it characterizes the division property of any order. It also
focuses on the division property of low and high orders. Section 4 explains how
to build distinguishers by means of parity sets and Section 5 analyzes the special
case of SPN ciphers. In Section 6, low-data distinguishers for the block cipher
Present are presented. Finally, Section 7 discusses the properties that an Sbox
must exhibit in order to resist the above attacks.
2 Parity set of a set
2.1 Preliminaries
A Boolean function of n variables can be alternatively represented as a multivari-
ate polynomial, named the Algebraic Normal Form (aka ANF) of the function,
or as a 2n-bit vector (named the value vector) corresponding to all f(x), x ∈ Fn2 .
Polynomial representation. We use the following notation for the monomials of
n variables where u is an element of Fn2 :
xu =
n∏
i=1
xuii .
The following well-known lemma will be extensively used for evaluating a mono-
mial at a given point.
Lemma 1. Let x and u be two n-bit words. Then xu = 1 if and only if u  x,
i.e., ui ≤ xi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The previous relation between n-bit words is a partial order. It equivalently
means that the support of u is included in the support of x. In the whole paper,
we will use the following notation for the set of all words less than (resp. greater
than) a given word with respect to this partial order.
Notation 1 Let u ∈ Fn2 . Then, we define
Prec(u) = {x ∈ Fn2 : x  u}
Succ(u) = {x ∈ Fn2 : u  x} .
It is worth noticing that Prec(u) is a linear subspace of dimension wt(u), while
Succ(u) is an affine subspace of dimension (n− wt(u)).
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Value vector. When a Boolean function is represented by its value vector, it is
often convenient to use the terminology coming from coding theory since Boolean
functions have been widely studied for error-correction. In this context, the value
vector of a function is seen as a codeword from a Reed-Muller code [21, 20].
Definition 1 (Reed-Muller codes). Let n be a positive integer and r an in-
teger such 0 ≤ r ≤ n. The r-th order binary Reed-Muller code of length 2n,
denoted by R(r, n), is the set formed by the value vectors of all Boolean func-
tions of n variables with degree at most r:
R(r, n) = {(f(x), x ∈ Fn2 ), f : Fn2 → F2 with deg f ≤ r} .
2.2 Parity set of a set
We now define a new notion named parity set. We will show that any set is
characterized by its parity set. Any property of a set can then also be expressed
in terms of its parity set, and we will show that the division property has a very
simple expression by means of parity sets.
Definition 2. Let X be a set of elements in Fn2 . The parity set of X, denoted
by U(X), is the subset of Fn2 defined by
U(X) = {u ∈ Fn2 :
⊕
x∈X
xu = 1} .
The parity set provides a complete characterization of a set, as shown by the
following results.
Lemma 2. Let G be the 2n × 2n binary matrix whose entries are indexed by
n-bit vectors and defined by
Gu,a = a
u, a, u ∈ Fn2 .
For any subset X of Fn2 , the incidence vector of U(X) is equal to the product of
G by the incidence vector of X.
Proof. The incidence vector of a set X, vX , is the 2
n-bit vector having a one
at position x ∈ Fn2 if and only if x ∈ X. Then, GvX is equal to the sum of all
columns of G indexed by the elements in the support of vX , i.e., indexed by the
elements in X:
(GvX)u =
⊕
x∈X
xu .
By definition, the support of vU(X) is then the set of all positions u such that
(GvX)u = 1. ut
We can now deduce that there is a one-to-one correspondence between sets and
their parity sets.
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Theorem 1. Let G be the 2n × 2n binary matrix defined by
Gu,a = a
u, a, u ∈ Fn2 .
Then, G is non-singular and G−1 = G. Therefore, for any subset U of Fn2 , there
exists a unique set X ⊂ Fn2 such that U(X) = U .
Proof. The fact that G is non-singular can be deduced by using that it is a
generator matrix of the Reed-Muller code of length 2n and order n. This code
has dimension 2n [19, Page 376], i.e., G is invertible. Its inverse is equal to G
itself. Indeed, for any u,w ∈ Fn2 , we have
(G×G)u,w =
⊕
v∈Fn2
Gu,vGv,w =
⊕
v∈Fn2
vuwv
= |{v ∈ Fn2 : u  v and v  w}| mod 2
=
{
2wt(w)−wt(u) mod 2 if u  w
0 otherwise.
We then deduce that (G×G)u,w = 1 if and only if u = w, i.e., G×G = Id. As a
direct consequence, we get that the mapping vX 7→ vU(X) is an isomorphism of
the set of 2n-bit vectors. ut
The fact that G is involutive provides a simple way to find the set X correspond-
ing to a given parity set U . Indeed, X corresponds to the parity set of U . Some
useful examples are described in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let X be a subset of Fn2 . Then,
– U(X) is empty if and only if X is empty.
– U(X) = Prec(x) if and only if X = {x}.
– U(X) = {u} if and only if X = Prec(u).
– U(X) = {1} if and only if X = Fn2 ,
where 1 denotes the all-one vector in Fn2 .
3 New insights into the division property
3.1 The division property by means of parity sets
The division property introduced by Todo in [25] is a distinguishing property of
the set Ek(X) for a given choice of the input set X, where Ek is (typically) a
keyed permutation. This property must be independent from the choice of the
secret key. We now reformulate the division property of order k, Dnk , on a set X
by a simple property of U(X). Indeed, Dnk corresponds to a lower bound on the
weights of all elements in U(X).
Definition 3. A set X of elements in Fn2 is said to fulfill the division property
of order k, Dnk , if all elements in U(X) have weight at least k, i.e.,
U(X) ⊆ {u ∈ Fn2 : wt(u) ≥ k} .
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It is worth noticing that in [25], the division property is defined for a multiset,
i.e., the elements in X may appear with some multiplicity. However, the origi-
nal division property for a multiset X equivalently corresponds to the division
property for the set composed of all elements in X having an odd multiplicity.
Therefore, we will only focus on sets, instead of multisets.
As a direct consequence of the matrix relationship exhibited in Lemma 2, we
deduce the following two characterizations of the incidence vectors of the sets
satisfying the division property of order k.
Proposition 1. Let X be a set of elements in Fn2 and k be an integer 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
Then, the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) X fulfills the division property of order k, Dnk .
(ii) The incidence vector of X belongs to the Reed-Muller code of length 2n and
order (n− k).
(iii) The incidence vector of X belongs to the dual of the Reed-Muller code of
length 2n and order (k − 1).
Proof. Assertion (ii) equivalently means that the incidence vector of U(X) van-
ishes at all positions u with wt(u) ≤ k − 1. This means that, if G′ denotes the
restriction of G to the rows of index u with wt(u) < k, then G′vX is the all-zero
vector. But G′ is a generator matrix of the Reed-Muller code of length 2n and
order (k − 1). The set of all vX such that G′vX = 0 is therefore the dual (i.e.,
the orthogonal) of R(k−1, n). It is well-known (see e.g. [19, Page 375]) that, for
any r, the dual of R(r, n) is the Reed-Muller code R(n − r − 1, n). We deduce
that G′vX = 0 if and only if vX ∈ R(n− k, n). ut
The first one of the previous characterization, (ii), has been independently ex-
hibited by Khovratovich [14], while the equivalent formulation (iii) is new.
Using the minimum distance of the Reed-Muller codes, we recover very easily
a result from [22] on the minimal size of a set satisfying Dnk . More importantly,
we are able to characterize the sets of minimal size satisfying Dnk .
Proposition 2. Let X be a non-empty set of elements in Fn2 satisfying Dnk .
Then
|X| ≥ 2k .
Moreover, a set X of size 2k satisfies Dnk if and only if X is an affine subspace1
of dimension k.
Proof. We here use that X satisfies Dnk if and only if vX belongs to R(n− k, n).
It is well-known that the minimum distance of R(n− k, n) is 2k [19, Page 375].
Using that |X| = wt(vX), we deduce that |X| ≥ 2k.
Moreover, it is known that the minimum-weight codewords in R(n − k, n)
are the incidence vectors of the affine subspaces of dimension k [19, Page 380].
It follows that a set of size 2k satisfies Dnk if and only if it is an affine subspace
of dimension k. ut
1 In the whole paper, the terminology affine subspace includes any linear subspace or
any coset of a linear subspace.
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3.2 Division property of low order
Since the codewords of Reed-Muller codes of low order have a very simple form,
a simple characterization of the division properties of low order directly fol-
lows. The Reed-Muller code R(0, n) consists of the all-zero and all-one words,
R(0, n) = {0, 1}, and R(1, n) \ R(0, n) is composed of all incidence vectors of
affine hyperplanes. Then, we easily recover the characterization of the division
properties of order 1 and 2 exhibited in [25]:
– X fulfills Dn1 if and only if its cardinality is even.
– X fulfills Dn2 if and only if its cardinality is even and it has the Balance
property [16], i.e., ⊕x∈Xx = 0.
Then, the division property of order k > 2 generalizes the balance property
used in integral attacks [16] in the following sense.
Proposition 3. Let X be a set of elements in Fn2 . Then, the following assertions
are equivalent:
(i) X fulfills the division property of order k, Dnk .
(ii) For any set of coordinates {i1, . . . , it} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size t < k and any
constant α ∈ Ft2, the number of elements in X such that xij = αj for all
1 ≤ j ≤ t is even.
(iii) For any set of coordinates {i1, . . . , it} ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size t < k, the number
of elements in X such that xij = 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t is even.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) Let I = {i1, . . . , it} be a set of coordinates of size t < k, and
u be the vector in Fn2 having support I. Then,
{x ∈ X : xij = αj , 1 ≤ j ≤ t} = {x ∈ X : (x⊕ β)  u}
where β is the n-bit vector such that βij = αj ⊕ 1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ t, and βi = 0
if i 6∈ I. It follows that
|{x ∈ X : xij = αj , 1 ≤ j ≤ t}| mod 2 =
⊕
x∈X
(x⊕ β)u =
⊕
x∈X
⊕
vu
xvβu⊕v
=
⊕
vu
βu⊕v
(⊕
x∈X
xv
)
= 0
since the division property of order k implies that all
⊕
x∈X x
v vanish when
wt(v) ≤ wt(u) < k.
(ii) ⇒ (iii) Trivial.
(iii) ⇒ (i) Let u ∈ Fn2 with wt(u) < k. We have⊕
x∈X
xu =
⊕
x∈X
((x⊕ u)⊕ u)u =
⊕
vu
⊕
x∈X
(x⊕ u)vuu⊕v
=
⊕
vu
⊕
x∈X
(x⊕ u)v =
⊕
vu
|{x ∈ X : xi = 0,∀i ∈ Supp(v)}| mod 2 .
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From (iii), all sets involved in the previous sum have even size because
wt(v) < k. We then deduce that
⊕
x∈X x
u = 0, i.e. X fulfills the division
property of order k.
ut
It is worth noticing that, more generally, the division property Dnk implies that
the number of elements inX∩A is even for any affine subspaceA of dimension t >
n− k (see e.g. [7, Prop III.1]).
As a direct corollary, we can for instance characterize the division property
of order 3.
Corollary 2. Let X be a set of elements in Fn2 . Then, X fulfills the division
property of order 3, Dn3 , if and only if X and all the n subsets
{x ∈ X with xi = 0}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
satisfy the balance property.
Example 1. The following set X ∈ F52 composed of 12 elements satisfy the divi-
sion property of order 3:
x1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
x2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 0
x3 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
x4 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
x5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1
3.3 Division property of high order
The division property of maximal order, i.e., Dnn, obviously corresponds to the
fact that X is either empty, or equal to the whole set Fn2 (see the last item in
Corollary 1). But, we are also able to characterize all sets satisfying Dnn−1.
Proposition 4. Let X be a set of elements in Fn2 . Then X fulfills Dnn−1 and
not Dnn if and only if X is an (affine) hyperplane of Fn2 .
Proof. Let v denote the incidence vector of X. From the previous proposition,
we have X satisfies Dnn−1 and not Dnn if and only if v ∈ R(1, n) \ R(0, n). This
set consists of the incidence vectors of all (affine) hyperplanes of F2. Then, this
equivalently means that X is an (affine) hyperplane. ut
For instance, it can be easily checked that the multiset of elements of F42 defined
in [25, Page 293]
{0x0, 0x3, 0x3, 0x3, 0x5, 0x6, 0x8, 0xb, 0xd, 0xe},
satisfies D43 because the corresponding set composed of all elements with an odd
multiplicity
{0x0, 0x3, 0x5, 0x6, 0x8, 0xb, 0xd, 0xe}
is a linear subspace of dimension 3 spanned by {0x3, 0x5, 0x8}.
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4 Distinguishers based on parity sets
We now investigate how we can build some distinguishers for a given keyed
permutation EK by means of parity sets. The basic idea consists in choosing an
input set X such that the parity set of the corresponding output set EK(X) has
some specific property for any choice of the key.
Since the size of X determines the data complexity of the distinguisher, it
has to be as small as possible. For this reason, X is always chosen to be an affine
subspace since subspaces are the smallest possible sets satisfying the division
property of a given order (see Prop. 2).
4.1 Todo’s distinguishers
The strategy proposed by Todo to build a distinguisher is to exhibit an affine
subspace a+ V such that the corresponding output set EK(a+ V ) satisfies the
division property of order 2, i.e., such that EK(a+V ) is balanced. This property
can be easily interpreted in terms of higher-order derivatives in the sense of the
following definition.
Definition 4. [17] Let F be a function from Fn2 into F
m
2 . Let a ∈ Fn2 . The
derivative of F with respect to a is the function from Fn2 into F
m
2 defined by
DaF (x) = F (x⊕ a)⊕ F (x) .
For any k-dimensional subspace V of Fn2 and for any basis of V , {a1, . . . , ak},
the k-th order derivative of F with respect to V is the function defined by
DV F (x) = Da1Da2 . . . DakF (x) =
⊕
v∈V
F (x+ v)
We introduce now the following notation.
Notation 2 Let P be a permutation of Fn2 and P1, P2, . . . , Pn be the n coor-
dinates of P . If x = (x1, . . . , xn) and u = (u1, . . . , un) are vectors of F
n
2 , we
denote by Pu(x) the coordinate product
∏n
i=1 Pi(x)
ui .
Proposition 5. Let P be a permutation of Fn2 . Let V be the linear subspace of
Fn2 and a ∈ Fn2 . Then, an element u belongs to U(P (a + V )) if and only if the
derivative of Pu with respect to V satisfies
DV P
u(a) = 1 .
In the particular case where V = Prec(v) for some v ∈ Fn2 , the following formu-
lation are equivalent:
(i) For all a ∈ Fn2 , u 6∈ U(P (a+ V ))
(ii) The algebraic normal form of the Boolean function x 7→ Pu(x) contains no
monomial multiple of xv
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(iii) The superpoly of v in x 7→ Pu(x) vanishes.
Proof. The fact that DV P
u(a) = 1 if and only if u ∈ U(P (a + V )) is directly
deduced from the definition of the derivative with respect to V using that
DV P
u(a) =
⊕
x∈a+V
Pu(x) .
The superpoly of v in Pu is defined [12] as the Boolean function pv such that
Pu(x) = xvpv(x) + q(x)
where q does not contain any monomial multiple of xv. Moreover, it has been
proved in [12, Th. 1] that
pv(a) =
⊕
xv
Pu(a⊕ x) = DV Pu(a) .
It then follows that, for V = Prec(v), u 6∈ U(P (a + V )) for all a if and only if
the superpoly of v in Pu vanishes, which equivalently means that Pu does not
contain any monomial multiple of xv. ut
4.2 Improving Todo’s distinguishers
The distinguishers presented in [25] correspond to the existence of a word v such
that EK(a + Prec(v)) satisfies the division property of order 2 for all a, which
equivalently means that the monomial xv does not appear in any coordinate of
EK . Since these distinguishers are constructed by propagating some information
on the smallest Hamming weight of the elements in the parity set, they are based
on the fact that the weight of v exceeds the degree of EK , where the degree of
the coordinates of the cipher after several iterations can be upper bounded by
exploiting the techniques introduced in [6, 5]. However, it clearly appears that
this type of distinguishers can be improved in the following two directions:
– it may happen that a given monomial xu does not appear in the coordinates
of EK even if wt(u) ≤ degP . This type of property, derived from the sparsity
of some coordinates of the cipher, has been extensively used in cube attacks,
e.g. [1, 13, 11].
– it may happen that a given monomial xu appears in one coordinate of EK but
not in all functions x 7→ EvK(x). Then, EK(a + Prec(u)) does not fulfill the
division property of order 2; instead we obtain a weaker distinguisher based
on the fact that a given v does not belong to the parity set of EK(a+Prec(u)).
These two ways of exploiting some additional information besides the degree of
the function are illustrated in the following toy example. In the rest of the paper,
binary words are represented in hexadecimal notation where the least significant
bit corresponds to the rightmost bit in the binary word.
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Example 2. Let us consider the 4-bit Sbox S used in Present [2]. This Sbox
has degree 3 which is the maximal degree for a permutation of F42. The rows of
Table 1 describes all sets
Vs(u) = {v ∈ Fn2 : Sv(x) contains xu} .
In others words, the entry at Row u and Column v in this table is an x if and
only if xu appears in the ANF of x 7→ Sv(x). Equivalently, the column of index v
VS(u)
0 1 2 4 8 3 5 9 6 a c 7 b d e f
0 x x x x
1 x x x x
2 x x x x
4 x x x x
8 x x x x x x
3 x x x x x x x x
5 x x x
9 x x x x x x
6 x x x x x x
a x x x x x x x x x x
c x x x x
7 x x x x x x x
b x x x x x x x x x x
d x x x x x x x
e x x x x x x
f x
Table 1. Sets VS(u) for all u ∈ F42 for the Present Sbox. All 4-bit words are repre-
sented in hexadecimal notation, and the rightmost bit of the word corresponds to the
least significant bit.
in this table corresponds the list of all monomials in the ANF of x 7→ Sv(x).
Clearly, we cannot exhibit any u such that S(a+Prec(u)) fulfills the division
property of order 2 for all a (i.e. such that no coordinate of S contains xu) if we
exploit the degree of the Sbox only. Indeed, using that deg(S) = 3, we deduce
that the all-one vector u = 0xf is the only value satisfying this property. This
does not provide any distinguisher since this holds for all permutations.
However, distinguishers can be found by using that not all u ∈ F42 of weight
less than or equal to 3 appear in the ANF of the coordinates of S. Indeed u = 0xe
does not appear in any of the coordinates of S, i.e., for u = 0xe, S(a+ Prec(u))
fulfills the division property of order 2 for all a. It is worth noticing that this is
the only value of u which provides such a distinguisher.
Instead of searching for u such that the parity set of S(a+Prec(u)) does not
contain any word of weight 1, we can exhibit a few values v which belong to none
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of the sets S(a+ Prec(u)), a ∈ F42. For instance, we can observe that neither S1
nor Se contains a multiple of x3 = x1x2. This means that v = 0x1 and v = 0xe
do not belong to a set S(a+ Prec(0x3)). Similarly, the sets S(a+ Prec(0x9)) do
not contain v = 0x1 and v = 0xb. The sets S(a + Prec(0xc)) do not contain
v = 0x1 and v = 0x6.
Clearly, these two ideas allow us to decrease the dimension of the input
subspace X = a + Prec(u) involved in the distinguisher. But the distinguisher
based on the division property of order 2 is obviously stronger than the second
one. A precise evaluation of the advantages of these distinguishers is provided in
Appendix.
5 Exhibiting distinguishers on SPN by means of parity
sets
We now show how to find some distinguishers on iterated block ciphers, especially
on substitution-permutation networks, by propagating some information on the
parity set of the output set through the successive rounds of the cipher. As
previously explained, we choose as input set an affine subspace.
5.1 Propagation through key addition
One of the difficulties for finding a distinguisher for a block cipher is that the
distinguishing property must hold for any value of the secret key. For this rea-
son, we need to exploit a property which can be easily propagated through the
operation inserting the round key, which is usually an XOR. This is the case of
differential properties, or of the algebraic degree. We can show that the parity
set can also be easily propagated.
Proposition 6. Let X be a subset of Fn2 with parity set U(X). Then, for any
k ∈ Fn2 , the parity set of (k +X) satisfies
U(k +X) ⊆
⋃
u∈U(X)
Succ(u) .
Proof. We use that
(x⊕ k)v =
⊕
uv
xvkv⊕u .
It follows that⊕
x∈X
(x⊕ k)v =
⊕
x∈X
⊕
uv
xukv⊕u =
⊕
uv
kv⊕u
(⊕
x∈X
xu
)
.
Then, this sum equals zero for all k ∈ Fn2 if
⊕
x∈X x
u = 0 for all u such that
u  v. In other words, if the sum equals one, then there exists u in U(X) such
that u  v, i.e., v satisfies v  u for at least one u ∈ U(X). ut
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It is worth noticing that there is no general improvement of the previous result
which holds without any further assumption on k or on X. Indeed, it is easy to
check that, when X = {u}, we have that any v ∈ Succ(u) belongs to U(k + X)
for some k (e.g. k = (u+v) satisfies this property). Thus, Succ(u) is the smallest
set which contains the parity sets of all cosets (k +X) in this case.
5.2 Propagation through an Sbox
We now investigate how a parity set propagates through a permutation, for
instance through an Sbox or through a linear permutation.
Proposition 7. Let S be a permutation of Fn2 . For any v ∈ Fn2 , we define
VS(u) = {v ∈ Fn2 : Sv(x) contains xu}
Then, for any set X of elements of Fn2 ,
U(S(X)) ⊆
⋃
u∈U(X)
VS(u) .
Proof. By definition, the vectors v which may be in U(S(X)) are those such
that S(x)v contains a monomial xu with u ∈ U(X). Otherwise, we have that⊕
x∈X S(x)
v = 0. The result then directly follows. ut
We will discuss in more details in Section 7 the properties of an Sbox which make
it resistant or not to this attack. It is worth noticing that the previous proposition
applies to any permutation S, including the case where S corresponds to the
linear layer of the cipher.
Another case of interest is the case where the Sbox can be seen as the con-
catenation of several independent Sboxes, like in a typical Sbox layer.
Proposition 8. Let X be a set of elements in Fmt2 and let S be an Sbox over
Fmt2 which consists of the parallel application of t Sboxes S1, . . . , St over F
m
2 :
S(x1, . . . , xt) = (S1(x1), . . . , St(xt)). Then,
U(S(X)) ⊆
⋃
(u1,...,ut)∈U(X)
VS1(u1)× . . .× VSt(ut)
where VSi(u) = {v ∈ Fm2 : Svi (x) contains xu}.
Proof. From Prop. 7, we know that
U(S(X)) ⊆
⋃
(u1,...,ut)∈U(X)
VS(u) .
We then have to determine all v = (v1, . . . , vt) ∈ (Fm2 )t such that Sv(x) contains
u = (u1, . . . , ut). We use that
Sv(x) = Sv11 (x1)S
v2
2 (x2) . . . S
vt
t (xt) .
Since only Svii (xi) may contain x
ui
i , we deduce that v ∈ VS(u) if and only if
vi ∈ VSi(ui) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore, VS(u) is the Cartesian product of all
VSi(ui). ut
13
5.3 Propagation through one round
We now consider an SPN where the round key is inserted by addition at the
end of the round. This implies that each Sbox layer comes after a round-key
addition. Thus, if U(X) denotes the parity set of the input set X before the key
addition, then the parity set after the key addition is included in a union of sets
of the form Succ(u), for some u ∈ Fn2 . It follows that the parity set after the
Sbox layer satisfies
U(S(X + k)) ⊆
⋃
u∈U(X)
 ⋃
v∈Succ(u)
VS(v)
 .
Therefore, propagating the information from U(X) to U(S(X + k)) involves the
sets
VS(u) =
⋃
v∈Succ(u)
VS(v)
which depend on the Sbox only.
These sets VS(u) are then the relevant quantities involved in the propagation
through the Sbox, instead of the sets VS(u), u ∈ Fn2 . For instance, Table 2
provides all sets VS(u) for the Present Sbox.
VS(u)
0 1 2 4 8 3 5 9 6 a c 7 b d e f
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
2 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
4 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
8 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
3 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
9 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
6 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
a x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
c x x x x x x x x x x x x x
7 x x x x x x x x
b x x x x x x x x x x
d x x x x x x x x
e x x x x x x
f x
Table 2. Sets VS(u) for all u ∈ F42 for the Present Sbox. All 4-bit words are repre-
sented in hexadecimal notation, and the rightmost bit of the word corresponds to the
least significant bit.
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The table representing all VS(u) has a few generic properties which hold for
any bijective Sbox. The first obvious remark is that the all-zero vector does not
belong to any VS(u) except when u = 0. Indeed S0 is the all-one function and
then does not contain any monomial except x0. The following property is much
more interesting.
Proposition 9. Let S be any permutation of Fn2 . Then,
VS(1) = {1} ,
where 1 denotes the all-one vector in Fn2 .
Proof. Since Succ(1) = 1, we have
VS(1) = VS(1) = {v ∈ Fn2 : Sv(x) contains x1}
or equivalently VS(1) is the set of all v such that x 7→ Sv(x) has degree n. It is
known [6, Prop. 1] that deg(Sv) = n if and only if v = 1. ut
Some further properties of Table 2, specific to the Present Sbox will be
studied in Section 7.
6 Low-data distinguishers on a few rounds of Present
6.1 Distinguisher on 3 rounds
In [25] Todo presents generic distinguishers for ciphers based on the SPN con-
struction. In particular, it is shown in Table 4 of this same paper that 3 rounds
of an SPN construction whose nonlinear layer is composed of 16 Sboxes over F42
of degree 3 can be distinguished from a random permutation with data com-
plexity 212. These results are therefore valid for Present. This distinguisher
improves upon the distinguishers exploiting the algebraic degree since the best
upper bound on the degree of three rounds of such ciphers is 33 = 27, leading
to a distinguisher with data complexity 228.
Todo’s distinguisher can be easily explained in the following way (see also [14]).
Suppose that the input space X is composed of vectors taking all possible 24
values on the first three nibbles and where the last 13 nibbles are fixed to a same
constant value for all vectors. In this case |X| = 212 and X can be seen now as
a coset of V , i.e. X = a+ V , where
V = Prec(0x0000000000000fff) .
After the application of the round-key addition and the Sbox layer to X, the
output space Y satisfies the same integral property as X, i.e. Y = b+V . Denote
now by F = R2 ◦P , where R stands for the round function and where P denotes
the linear layer. One can easily see that as F contains two non-linear layers, of
degree 3 each, deg(F ) ≤ 9. Therefore, as dimY = 12 > 9, we have that⊕
x∈a+V
EK(X) =
⊕
y∈b+V
F (Y ) =
⊕
y∈V
F (b⊕ y) = DV F (b) = 0.
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Equivalently, this generic distinguisher on 3 rounds uses the feature that none
of the coordinates of EK contains a multiple of x
u for u = 0x0000000000000fff
(see Prop. 5). This distinguisher can therefore be very easily explained in terms
of parity sets. Since X = a + V , where V = Prec(0x0000000000000fff), we
have that U(V ) = {0x0000000000000fff} (from Corollary 1), implying that
U(X) ⊆ Succ(0x0000000000000fff).
Since the Sbox S is a permutation, for each Sbox VS(0xf) = {0xf} (Prop. 9)
meaning that after the first Sbox layer the parity set U of the resulting set is
again included in Succ(0x0000000000000fff). By defining the function F as
before, we have that
U(EK(X)) ⊆
⋃
u∈U
VF (u).
But, VF (u) = {v : F v(x) contains xu} contains no vector v with wt(v) ≤ 1 when
wt(u) ≥ 12 since deg(F ) ≤ 9. Therefore,
U(EK(X)) ⊆ {v : wt(v) ≥ 2},
meaning that the output of the cipher restricted to 3 rounds has the balanced
property (i.e., satisfies the division property of order 2).
6.2 Distinguisher on 4 rounds
As explained in [25] in the case of AES-like ciphers, such generic distinguishers
can be improved by exploiting the structure of the linear layer. In the particular
case of Present, the linear layer (see Figure 1) is a bit permutation. Moreover,
because of its structure, two rounds of Present (without the last permutation
layer) can be seen as the concatenation of four independent Superboxes operating
on F162 . With this structure, it is clear that any coordinate of the output at round
(r + 1) of the cipher only contains monomials involving inputs from the same
Superbox at round r.
Therefore, by exploiting the linear layer of Present one can extend the
previous distinguisher to one more round as follows. Suppose now that the input
set X has the form X = a+ V , with
V = Prec(0x000000000000fff0).
In this case U(X) ⊆ Succ(0x000000000000fff0). The parity set remains un-
changed after the application of the first nonlinear layer. By applying now the
permutation layer we see that the parity set of the resulting set is included in
Succ(0x000e000e000e000e),
16
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
S
ki
ki+1
Fig. 1. Round function of the block cipher Present
leading to four active Superboxes. As previously explained, after the application
of the Superboxes, so after the non-linear layer of the third round, any output
coordinate only contains monomials coming from the same Superbox. Therefore,
the resulting parity set is included in
{u : wt(u) ≥ 4}.
By applying now the linear layer we have that the parity set is included in
{u with ≥ 2 active nibbles} ∪ {0x00 . . . 0f, . . . , 0xf0 . . . 0}.
This parity set is invariant under the application of the fourth nonlinear layer,
meaning that
U(EK(X)) ⊆ {v : wt(v) ≥ 2}.
We see therefore that the output set has the balanced property after 4 rounds.
However, it can be shown, that by only exploiting the properties of the linear
layer of Present, this distinguisher cannot always be extended to five rounds.
The following table shows a possible propagation of values in the parity sets,
where some output coordinate of the 12th Sbox after 5 rounds may contain the
monomial xu, with u = 0x0000000000000fff0. By looking at rows 2 and 3 of
this table, we can see that this propagation can be realised, among others, if
the Sbox makes the propagations 0xe → 0x2 and 0xe → 0x1 possible. All the
elements of this table should be interpreted as hexadecimal values.
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input 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f 0
output S-layer 1st round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f 0
output P-layer 1st round 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 e
output S-layer 2nd round 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
output P-layer 2nd round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
output S-layer 3rd round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1
output P-layer 3rd round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 7
output S-layer 4th round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 8
output P-layer 4th round 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
output S-layer 5th round 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
However, by looking closer at Table 1, one can see that these two propagations
are not possible for the Present Sbox, as 0xe can only be propagated to values
of Hamming weight of at least 2.
6.3 Distinguishers on 5 and 6 rounds
The previous 4-round distinguisher on Present exploited the algebraic degree
of the Sbox together with the structure of the linear layer. We show here, that
by further taking into account the particular form of the Present Sbox, the
previous distinguisher can be extended to one more round. For doing so, we
consider the same input set X as for the 4-round distinguisher, i.e. X = a+ V ,
with V = Prec(0x000000000000fff0). As previously shown (see also the second
row of the table above), after the application of the first round transformations,
the parity set is included in Succ(0x000e000e000e000e). However, the value 0xe
presents, in the case of Present, a particular interest. Indeed, notice that the
row indexed by 0xe in Table 2 contains only a single element of weight 2 and
no element of weight 1. This means that compared to other values u, VS(u)
for u = 0xe contains exceptionally few elements, making more than half of the
transitions impossible. In particular, the transitions, 0xe→ 0x2 and 0xe→ 0x1
in the above 5-round path are not possible.
We checked by computer programming that in this setting, there is no u
of weight 1 in U(Ek(X)) if Ek is 5-round Present. Therefore, the output set
after 5 rounds has the balanced property and can then be distinguished from a
random permutation.
However, it is not possible to extend the distinguisher in its actual form to
6 rounds. Indeed, we checked that after 6 rounds, many elements of weight 1
can be found in U(Ek(X)). Nevertheless, it is still possible to exhibit a weaker
distinguisher for 6 rounds of Present, by exploiting the fact that the column
corresponding to the element 0x1 in Table 2 is very sparse, meaning that more
than half of the transitions u→ 0x1 are not possible. We were able to check that
in fact, among all the elements of weight 1 present in U(Ek(X)), only the nibble
values 0x2, 0x4 and 0x8 were possible. Therefore, we have exhibited 16 values
which do not belong to U(Ek(X)) after six rounds of Present, leading to a
distinguisher with data complexity 212 and advantage (1− 2−16) (see Appendix
for the evaluation of the advantage).
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6.4 Distinguishers using more data
We provide in Table 3 a summary of all the distinguishers obtained for reduced-
round versions of Present by using different sizes of the input space. These
distinguishers were obtained by implementing the propagation of the parity set of
the input subspace in a compact way. We mention here only strong distinguishers
in the sense that we give only the results where the output set has the balanced
property.
Input set log2(#texts) Rounds
0x000000000000000f 4 4
0x000000000000fff0 12 5
0x00000000ffffffff 32 6
0xfffffffffffff000 52 7
0xfffffffffffffffe 63 8
Table 3. Input sets leading to the division property of order 2 for reduced-round
Present.
6.5 Changing the Sbox
We discuss in this section the strength of the above distinguishers in the case
where the Sbox of Present is replaced by some other permutation of degree 3.
For this, we consider exactly the same cipher but we change the nonlinear per-
mutation. For instance, we consider the Sbox used in the block cipher Prince [3]
and we study the propagation of the parity set of the resulting cipher. Table 4
provides the sets VS(u) for all u ∈ F42 for this Sbox. However, it has to be noted
that we do not propose in any case to replace the Sbox of Present for obtaining
a more robust design in general. This change is done here only for being able
to run the same experiments by keeping exactly the same other parameters.
Applying for example the same attack to the Prince cipher and compare the
results would not make any sense as the results could be different because of the
different linear layers for example, making the impact of the Sbox unclear. This
paragraph aims only at demonstrating that Present with some other Sbox can
better resist against this type of distinguishers, but we do not argue that this
would necessarily be the case for other type of attacks.
The following table is the equivalent of Table 2 for Present. As one can
see, this table, is much less sparse than Table 2. In particular, even the rows
the more sparse (rows corresponding to 0xb and 0xd), make at least half of the
transitions possible. One can further notice that all rows and columns contain
elements of weight 1 and 2. All the above indicate that whatever the input u of
a particular Sbox, the set VS(u) contains a high number of values, making only
very few transitions impossible.
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VS(u)
0 1 2 4 8 3 5 9 6 a c 7 b d e f
0 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
1 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
2 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
4 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
8 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
3 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
5 x x x x x x x x x x x x x
9 x x x x x x x x x x
6 x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
a x x x x x x x x x x x x
c x x x x x x x x x x x x x
7 x x x x x x x x x x x x
b x x x x x x x
d x x x x x x
e x x x x x x x x x
f x
Table 4. Sets VS(u) for all u ∈ F42 for the Prince Sbox. All 4-bit words are represented
in hexadecimal notation.
We were able to verify, that if we start with the same input space as before,
the output set after five rounds does not satisfy the division property of order 2,
while this was the case for the Present Sbox. Indeed, Table 5 provides a path
that is satisfied when this Sbox is used. As one can see, we end up with a vector
of weight 1 in U(Ek). This was not the case with the original Present Sbox,
proving that the Prince Sbox is more resistant against this kind of property. A
more detailed study of why this is so is provided in the following section.
input 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f 0
output S-layer 1st round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 f f f 0
output P-layer 1st round 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 e 0 0 0 e
output S-layer 2nd round 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2
output P-layer 2nd round 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
output S-layer 3rd round 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
output P-layer 3rd round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 7 0
output S-layer 4th round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
output P-layer 4th round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6
output S-layer 5th round 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Table 5. Example of a 5-round path that is satisfied when the Prince Sbox is plugged
into the Present block cipher. All entries should be interpreted as hexadecimal values.
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7 Related security criterion for the Sbox
As illustrated by the previous attack, one of the main ingredients of the distin-
guisher is the particular form of the sets VS(u) for the Present Sbox, i.e., the
particular form of Table 2. Two properties of this table are exploited:
1. Column of index 0x1 is very sparse and in particular it does not contain
any element of weight 3 and it contains a single element of weight 2. This
property is exploited at the end of the attack on 6 rounds, where we use
that 0x1 only belongs to a very few sets VS(u), i.e., only a few transitions
u→ 0x1 are possible.
2. Row of index 0xe is very sparse and in particular it does not contain any
element of weight 1 and it contains a single element of weight 2. This property
is exploited when we use that VS(0xe) contains a few elements only, implying
that many transitions 0xe→ v are impossible.
We now show where these unsuitable properties of the Sbox come from, and how
they can be avoided. The first property has an obvious algebraic interpretation
since each column in the table is derived from the ANF of a Boolean function
x 7→ Sv(x). In particular, the columns having an index of weight 1 are derived
from the ANF of the coordinates of the Sbox. The ANF of the Present Sbox
is
S1(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1 + x3 + x4 + x2x3
S2(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x2 + x4 + x2x4 + x3x4 + x1x2x3 + x1x2x4 + x1x3x4
S3(x1, x2, x3, x4) = 1 + x3 + x4 + x1x2 + x1x4 + x2x4 + x1x2x4 + x1x3x4
S4(x1, x2, x3, x4) = 1 + x1 + x2 + x4 + x2x3 + x1x2x3 + x1x2x4 + x1x3x4 .
The first weakness of the Present Sbox then comes from the fact that its first
coordinate has degree 2 only and contains a single quadratic term.
The second weakness is related to the fact that the monomial xe = x2x3x4
appears neither in the coordinates of S, nor in most functions SiSj . This second
property can be deduced in a much simpler way from the ANF of the inverse
Sbox, as shown by the following proposition.
Lemma 3. Let S be a permutation of Fn2 . Then, for any u, v ∈ Fn2 , the ANF
of x 7→ S(x)v contains xu if and only if the ANF of x 7→ S∗(x)u contains xv,
where u denotes the vector u⊕ 1 and S∗ is the permutation x 7→ S−1(x).
Proof. Let au denote the coefficient of x
u in the ANF of x 7→ S(x)v. Then
au =
⊕
xu
S(x)v
= |{x ∈ Fn2 : xi = 0, i ∈ Supp(u) and S(x)j = 1, j ∈ Supp(v)}| mod 2
= |{y ∈ Fn2 : S−1(y)i = 0, i ∈ Supp(u) and yj = 1, j ∈ Supp(v)}| mod 2
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where the last equality comes from the fact that S is a permutation, implying
that there is a one-to-one correspondence between x and y = S(x). We now
replace y by z = y and use that S−1(y) = S∗(y). Then,
au = |{z ∈ Fn2 : S−1(z)i = 0, i ∈ Supp(u) and zj = 0, j ∈ Supp(v)}| mod 2
= |{z ∈ Fn2 : S∗(z)i = 1, i ∈ Supp(u) and zj = 0, j ∈ Supp(v)}| mod 2
=
⊕
zv
(S∗(z))
u
which means that au is the coefficient of x
v in the ANF of x 7→ S∗(x)u. ut
The function S∗ corresponding to the Present Sbox has the following ANF:
S∗1 (x1, x2, x3, x4) = 1 + x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x2x4
S∗2 (x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1 + x4 + x1x3 + x2x3 + x1x2x3 + x1x2x4 + x1x3x4
S∗3 (x1, x2, x3, x4) = 1 + x2 + x4 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x3x4 + x1x2x3
+x1x2x4 + x1x3x4
S∗4 (x1, x2, x3, x4) = x2 + x3 + x2x3 + x1x4 + x3x4 + x1x2x3 + x1x3x4
These ANF correspond to the rows with an index of weight 3 in Table 2. In
particular, the form of the row of index 0xe (defining VS(0xe)) comes from the
fact that the first coordinate of S∗ has degree 2 only, and that its ANF contains
a single monomial of degree 2.
Conversely, we can easily guarantee that, when an n-bit bijective Sbox is
considered, all sets VS(u) with wt(u) < n contain an element of weight 1.
Proposition 10. Let S be a permutation of Fn2 . Then, all coordinates of S
−1
have degree (n− 1) if and only if all sets VS(u), with u 6= 1, contain at least one
element of weight 1.
Proof. Since the sets VS(u) include all sets VS(u′) for u′  u, we only have to
prove the result for the sets VS(u) with wt(u) = n− 1. When wt(u) = n− 1, we
have
VS(u) = VS(u) ∪ VS(1) = VS(u) ∪ {1}
from Prop. 9. Therefore, all sets VS(u) with wt(u) < n contain an element of
weight 1 if and only if all sets VS(u) with wt(u) = n − 1 contain an element of
weight 1. This equivalently means that all monomials of degree (n − 1) appear
in the ANF of the coordinates of S, or from Lemma 3 that all coordinates of
S∗ have degree (n − 1). But, this last condition equivalently means that all
coordinates of S−1 have degree (n−1). Indeed, the monomials of highest degree
in the ANF of a Boolean function f and in the ANF of f∗ : x 7→ f(x) + 1 are
the same. Then the i-th coordinates of S∗ and S−1 have the same degree. ut
It is worth noticing that the fact that all coordinates of S−1 have maximal degree
is not equivalent to the fact that the same property holds for S, as shown in the
following example.
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Example 3. We consider the permutation of F42 corresponding to the inverse of
the function G10 defined in the classification in [18, Table 6]. This Sbox has
optimal cryptographic properties in the sense that it has the smallest possible
differential uniformity and highest nonlinearity. Its coordinates are given by
S1(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x1 + x1x2 + x2x3 + x3x4 + x1x3x4 + x2x3x4
S2(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x2 + x1x3 + x2x4 + x3x4 + x1x2x4 + x1x3x4 + x2x3x4
S3(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x3 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x2x4 + x1x2x4 + x1x3x4
S4(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x4 + x1x2 + x1x3 + x1x2x4 .
It can then be checked that all coordinates of S have degree 3 while the monomial
x1x2x3 appears in none of the coordinates, implying that VS(0x7) contains no
element of weight 1. Indeed,
VS(0x7) = {0x9, 0xc, 0x7, 0xb, 0xe, 0xf} .
Actually, S does not satisfy the hypotheses of Prop. 10 since the first coordinate
of S−1 has degree 2 only.
It is also worth noticing that the condition on the degree of the coordinates
of S−1 is not invariant under composition (to the right or left) by an affine
permutation.
A simple way to guarantee that all coordinates of the inverse Sbox have max-
imal degree consists in choosing for S an Sbox such that any linear combination
of its coordinates (i.e. any of its components) has maximal degree. In this case,
we obtain the following stronger result on the number of elements of weight 1 in
VS(u).
Corollary 3. Let S be a permutation of Fn2 such that the Boolean functions
x 7→ λ · S(x) have degree (n− 1) for all nonzero λ ∈ Fn2 . Then, for any u ∈ Fn2 ,
VS(u) contains at least (n− wt(u)) elements of weight 1.
Proof. We will first prove the result for all u with wt(u) = n − 1 by showing
that all coordinates of S−1 have degree (n− 1). Let A denote the n× n binary
matrix such that ai,j is the coefficient of the monomial of degree (n− 1) xej in
the ANF of the i-th coordinate of S where ej denotes the n-bit word having a
single one at Position j. A component of S, x 7→ λ · S(x), λ 6= 0, has degree less
than (n − 1) if and only if the corresponding linear combination of the rows of
A vanishes, i.e., λA = 0. It follows that the number of non-trivial components
of S with degree (n − 1) is equal to 2rk(A) − 1. From Lemma 3, the coefficients
of the monomials of degree (n − 1) in the coordinates of S−1 are defined by
the transpose of A. Then, the number of non-trivial components of S−1 with
degree (n − 1) is equal to 2rk(AT ) − 1. We deduce from Prop. 10 that, if all
components of S have degree (n− 1) (i.e., if rk(A) = rk(AT ) = n), all VS(u) for
u 6= 1 contain at least one element of weight 1.
Let us now consider any u ∈ Fn2 . By definition, VS(u) contains all sets VS(ei)
with i 6∈ Supp(u) since the k = (n − wt(u)) words ei of weight (n − 1) belong
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to Succ(u). As Matrix A has full rank, the k columns of A corresponding to the
monomials xei with i 6∈ Supp(u) have rank k, implying that this k×n-submatrix
has at least k nonzero rows. These rows correspond to the words of weight 1
which belong to VS(u), implying that this set contains at least k vectors of
weight 1. ut
Example 4. The 4-bit Sbox used in Prince [3] (as well as all Sboxes with sim-
ilar properties recommended for any cipher within the Prince-family [4, Ap-
pendix B]) has been chosen in such a way that all its nontrivial components
have degree 3. Then, we can guarantee that any set VS(u) contains at least
(4− wt(u)) elements of weight 1. This can be checked on Table 4.
It is worth noticing that the condition exhibited in Corollary 3 offers a similar
guarantee for the inverse Sbox. Indeed, making the decryption function also
immune to this type of attacks may be relevant, even if mounting the attack on
the decryption function is much more difficult in practice because it requires the
knowledge of plaintext-ciphertext pairs corresponding to chosen ciphertexts.
Application to the Misty Sboxes. So far, the most important application of the
division property is the cryptanalysis of the full Misty1 [24]. It is then relevant
to study the Misty Sboxes in the light of the previous criteria. Misty1 is an
unbalanced Feistel network. It then uses two different Sboxes, which are both
linearly equivalent to a power permutation. More precisely, S7 is a permutation
of degree 3 of F72 and S9 is a permutation of degree 2 of F
9
2.
We have then computed all sets VS(u) for each of these Sboxes. Most notably,
Tables 6 and 7 give the values of the minimal Hamming weight of an element
in VS(u) depending on the Hamming weight of u for the 7-bit Sbox S7 and
for the 9-bit Sbox S9 respectively. These tables then recover the results on the
propagation of the division property described in [24, Page 420]. The fact that,
for both Sboxes, many sets VS(u) have a large minimal weight show that the
two Misty Sboxes are weak regarding the division property. An interesting new
observation is that, for S7, for some vectors u of weight 3, for instance u = 0x0b,
VS7(u) does not contain any vector of weight 1. This equivalently means that
some monomials of degree 3 do not appear in any of the coordinates of S7.
This property of S7, which is more precise that the propagation of the division
property studied in [24], may then be exploited in an attack.
wt(u) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
min{wt(v) : v ∈ VS7(u)} 1 1 1 or 2 2 2 4 7
Table 6. Minimum Hamming weight of VS7(u) depending on the Hamming weight
of u for the 7-bit Sbox in Misty1.
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wt(u) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
min{wt(v) : v ∈ VS9(u)} 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 9
Table 7. Minimum Hamming weight of VS9(u) depending on the Hamming weight
of u for the 9-bit Sbox in Misty1.
8 Conclusions
In some contexts, the notion of parity set provides a powerful tool for represent-
ing subsets. We have shown for instance that the division property has a simple
formulation in terms of parity sets, which allows to easily deduce some properties
of the sets satisfying the division property of a given order. Also, focusing on
the parity set, and not only on the minimal weight of its elements, enables the
attacker to capture some algebraic properties of the nonlinear functions used in
the cipher, besides the algebraic degree. This general view also brings to light
the properties of the Sbox which avoid this type of attacks. The counterpart is
that computing the whole parity set after many rounds of a cipher is obviously
more expensive than considering its minimal weight only, as this is done in the
division property. However, a promising technique consists in combining both
approaches where the first and last rounds are analysed with the whole parity
set, while the propagation through the middle rounds only exploits the degree of
the function. Another direction could be to use parity sets for identifying some
sets of weak keys. We have focused on distinguishers which hold for all keys.
But, the addition of an unknown key increases the size of the parity set, since
all words greater than or equal to the words in the input parity set must be
considered. A different approach then consists in considering only round keys of
a particular form. Then, the resulting parity set after key addition may simplify
a lot, and these particular round keys may then be easily detected.
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A Advantages of the distinguishers based on parity sets
In order to estimate the advantages of the distinguishers exhibited in this paper,
we need to evaluate the probability that, given an input setX, a randomly chosen
permutation π is such that π(X) does not satisfy the division property of order 2.
For the weaker distinguisher, we similarly need to evaluate the probability that a
given u does not belong to U(π(X)). Clearly, the probability that π(X) satisfies
the division property of order 2 (i.e., is balanced) is close to 2−n, while the
probability that a given u does not belong U(π(X)) is close to 1/2. However,
these probabilities may vary with the size of X: for instance, if u is the all-zero
word, we have that u ∈ U(π(X)) if and only if |X| is odd. Also, if |X| is odd,
π(X) cannot satisfy the division property of order 2. A more careful analysis
seems therefore needed. The exact values of these probabilities confirming these
estimates are then given by the following propositions.
Proposition 11. Let u ∈ Fn2 . The probability over all sets X ⊆ Fn2 of size k
that u does not belong to U(X) is equal to
1
2
(
1 +
Pk(2
n−wt(u))(
2n
k
) ) ,
where Pk(w) is the Krawtchouk polynomial
Pk(x) =
k∑
i=0
(−1)i
(
x
i
)(
2n − x
k − i
)
.
In particular, if wt(u) = 1, this probability equals
1
2 if k is odd
1
2
(
1 + (−1)k/2 (
2n−1
k/2 )
(2
n
k )
)
' 12 if k is even.
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Proof. From Lemma 2, u 6∈ U(X) if and only if the product between the row
Gu of index u in Matrix G and the incidence vector of X vanishes. The row Gu
is a word of length 2n and weight 2n−wt(u) since Gu,v = 1 if and only if u  v.
Then we need to count the number of vectors vX of weight k such that the scalar
product Gu · vX = 0. It is known [10, Theorem 4.1] that, for any vector g of
length N = 2n, ∑
v∈FN2 ,wt(v)=k
(−1)g·v = Pk(wt(g)) .
Then,
Pr
X,|X|=k
[u 6∈ U(X)] = 1
2
(
1 +
Pk(2
n−wt(u))(
2n
k
) ) .
In the special case where wt(u) = 1, we need to estimate the value of Pk(2
n−1).
The generating function of the Krawtchouk polynomials is [23]
(1 + z)N−i(1− z)i =
N∑
`=0
P`(i)z
` .
We deduce that, for i = N/2, this generating function is (1− z2)N/2. It contains
monomials of even degree only, and then
P2`(N/2) = (−1)`
(
N/2
`
)
,
implying that
Pk(2
n−1) =
{
0 if k is odd
(−1)k/2
(
2n−1
k/2
)
if k is even.
The probability that u does not belong to U(X) is then is very close to 1/2 in
all cases. Indeed, the ratio of the two binomial coefficients satisfies(
2n−1
k/2
)(
2n
k
) = Θ (2−2n−1H2( k2n ))
where H2 is the binary entropy, H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x). ut
Similarly, the probability that a set X of given size k satisfies the division
property of order d is determined by the number of codewords of weight k in the
Reed-Muller code of length 2n and order (n− d). There is no known formula for
this number in general, but it can be computed when d = 2, which is the case
corresponding to Todo’s distinguishers.
Proposition 12. The probability that a set X ⊆ Fn2 of size k satisfies the divi-
sion property of order 2 is 0 if k is odd and
2−n + (−1)k/2(1− 2−n)
(
2n−1
k/2
)(
2n
k
) ' 2−n ,
if k is even.
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Proof. The result comes from the weight distribution of the Reed-Muller code
R(n − 2, n). Since this code is the dual of R(1, n), its weight distribution can
be derived from the weight distribution of the dual code by the MacWilliams
transform [19, Page 129]: the number of codewords of weight k in R(n− 2, n) is
Ak = 2
−(n+1) (Pk(0) + (2n+1 − 2)Pk(2n−1) + Pk(2n)) ,
where the Pk(i) are the previously defined Krawtchouk polynomials. From the
generating function, we get that Pk(0) =
(
2n
k
)
and Pk(2
n) = (−1)k
(
2n
k
)
, and the
value of Pk(2
n−1) has been computed in the proof of the previous proposition.
The result then directly follows. ut
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